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This paper explores the pre-First World War Austro-Hungarian economy as a prominent 
case where growing conflict between various ethnic and national groups within an 
empire might have contributed to the emergence of internal borders and even its 
eventual dissolution. To this end we adopt an Engel-and-Rogers–type approach to 
examine on an annual basis the extent of co-movements in grain prices across a sample 
of ten regional capital cities in the empire and over the period 1877-1910. There are two 
key findings. First, the political borders that emerged from 1918 onwards became 
visible in the price dynamics of grain markets already 20 years before the Great War. 
Second, this effect of a “border before a border” can be explained by the extent of 
language heterogeneity across the various parts of the Habsburg Empire. These results 
raise several important questions about both the forces that shaped pre-war market 
integration as well as the economic costs of breaking up the Habsburg customs union 
after 1918. 
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I. Introduction: Did ‘national’ borders matter in a ‘multi-national’ empire? 
 
This paper and the question it poses is motivated by two fairly distinct literatures. There 
is, first, an extensive historiography, reaching right back into the years immediately 
after the First World War, that examines the origins and impact of nationalism in the 
former Habsburg Empire as a multi-national state (recent work includes, for instance, 
Berend 2003; Rudolph and Good 1992). Yet most of this historical literature has a lot 
more to say on the political consequences of nationality conflicts within the empire than 
on their economic dimensions. In other words, we know very little about the extent to 
which, say, the Czechs or Germans or Hungarians were conditioned in their economic 
actions by language, nationality or loyalty to their region and how behavioural patterns 
along these lines changed over time. 
Second, there is a strand in the recent applied economics literature that views 
political borders as having a strong effect on both trade flows (McCallum 1995, 
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Wolf 2005) and price dynamics (Engel and Rogers 
1996), even after the removal of tariff barriers and controlling for exchange rate 
volatility or other macroeconomic variables (Engel, Rogers, and Wang 2003; Trenkler 
and Wolf 2005). Efforts to explain that ‘border effect” have focused on the role of 
business and social networks (Combes et al. 2004), drawing on a slightly older literature 
that stresses the trade creating effects of such networks (Rauch 2001, also Greif 1993). 
Hence, there seems to be a tension between trade creation through networks and its 
flipside, namely trade diversion across such networks. 
This paper seeks to explore the Austro-Hungarian customs union in the four 
decades or so before 1914 as a prominent case where growing conflict between various 
ethnic and national groups within an empire might have contributed to the emergence of 
internal borders and even its eventual dissolution. To this end we examine on an annual 
basis the extent of co-movement in grain prices across a sample of ten regional capital 
cities in the empire and over the period 1877-1910. The key issue we pursue here is 
whether the post-World War I boundaries between the empire’s successor states became 
already ‘visible’ in the pre-war price data. Crudely put, the idea is to see whether 
economic agents showed any preference to deal with others in the same region or of the 
same tongue (the latter as a proxy for ‘nationality’), or whether such shared 
characteristics were immaterial to their actions. Employing an Engel-and-Rogers–type 
approach to estimate the effects of ethnic and regional borders on price dynamics, 
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controlling for distance and location as well as for period-specific factors, we find that 
these potential internal borders did not impact on Habsburg grain markets up to about 
1895. Thereafter, however, the evidence suggests that there was a large and highly 
significant ‘nationality’ or language effect present up until the outbreak of the First 
World War. In other words, the political borders that emerged from 1918 onwards can 
be traced in price data already 20 years before the Great War. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly sketches out some 
key issues in the historiographical debate about the significance of ‘nationality’ 
conflicts in Habsburg economic development since 1867. Section 3 describes in some 
detail our dataset, including some descriptive statistics on the ten cities under 
consideration. In Section 4 we set out our empirical strategy to assess the effects of 
ethnic and regional borders on price dynamics and document the main results as well as 
the findings of some robustness analysis. Finally, Section 5 offers a discussion of the 
economic impact of these regional and ethnic (or linguistic) borders on the Habsburg 
economy and points to some broader implications. 
 
II. Economic integration, nationalism and the dissolution of Habsburg Empire  
 
At the turn of the 20th century, the Habsburg Empire was among the leading powers of 
Europe, with a share of roughly 13 per cent in total European population, producing 
about 10 per cent of Europe’s GDP. By the end of the First World War, the empire had 
militarily, politically and economically collapsed (Schulze, 2005a). The Treaties of St 
Germain (1919) and Trianon (1920) merely confirmed what had become reality from 
late October 1918: the Monarchy was dismembered and its territories were either 
incorporated into new nation states or ceded to neighbouring countries. Austria and 
Hungary were reduced to small landlocked rumps, while Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
and Poland emerged as independent nation states. The lands once tied together in a 
customs and monetary union were now separated by no less than eleven national 
borders, quantitative and non-quantitative barriers to trade and different national 
currencies. 
The causes of this collapse are still heavily disputed. Yet nationalism features as 
a key variable in most approaches, irrespective of whether they adopt a structuralist 
perspective on imperial decline (Wank, 1997a, b), point to the failure of political elites 
at the centre to engineer reform and maintain legitimacy (Jaszi, 1929; Taylor, 1948) or 
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focus on the uncompromising pursuit of, effectively, mutually exclusive political aims 
by the different nationalities in the crownlands (Kornish, 1949; Lieven, 2000). In short, 
historians have since long argued that the rise of national self-consciousness and 
growing conflict among the empire’s various nationalities, and the failure of the 1867 
Constitutional Settlement between Austria and Hungary to offer an institutional 
arrangement capable of diffusing this conflict, were major factors in the empire’s 
decline. In that view, the First World War was the final blow in a long process of 
dissolution. Linked to this perspective is the notion that inter-regional inequality and 
intensifying intra-empire economic nationalism undermined the coherence and 
performance of the Habsburg economy which, ultimately, only served to accelerate the 
empire’s demise in a war it was not economically fit to fight. Oszkár Jászi in his now 
classic Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (1929) put this case most dramatically 
when he wrote that, ‘by 1913, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was already a defeated 
empire from the economic point of view’. 
However, there is also a dissenting historiography that fairly emphatically rejects 
the notion of the empire’s fall as inevitable or the Habsburg state as having become 
unviable. It was losing the war that finished off the empire, but not any insurmountable 
structural, political or economic problems in the preceding decades (e.g. Sked, 2001). 
Interpretations along these line are broadly in tune with the findings of the last thirty or 
so years of research into the economic development of the Habsburg Empire. These 
make for a less damning assessment of Habsburg economic performance than earlier 
writing in the field such as, for example, Gerschenkron (1962). Even though economic 
growth and structural change in the empire were not nearly rapid enough to catch-up 
with the European leaders before the war (Schulze 2000, 2005b), the work, in particular, 
of David Good (1984) and John Komlos (1983, 1989) has shown that the origins of 
Kuznetsian Modern Economic Growth in the western regions of the empire reach back 
into the 18th century, that growth impulses began to diffuse from the more developed to 
the less advanced regions and that broad intra-empire market integration across the 
crownlands made significant progress over the course of the 19th century. The fact that 
the empire lost the Great War and that economic factors played a major role in this tells 
us that the war it came to fight was of a scale too large to sustain on the basis of 
resources at its disposal (Schulze, 2005a). It does not necessarily imply that Austria-
Hungary’s economy was too underdeveloped to maintain the empire’s territorial 
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integrity in peacetime (or, for that matter, in times of wars tha t made less demands on 
human and economic resources). 
Bruckmüller and Sandgruber (2003) observe an apparent contradiction between, 
on the one hand, increasing inter-regional economic integration within the empire over 
the 19th century and, on the other, the simultaneous rise of nationalist movements ‘based 
mainly on common language or national consciousness (…) [that] strongly ran counter 
to the collective consciousness of belonging to a common state’. Yet the historical 
evidence on the impact of nationalism on the empire’s economy is patchy and 
ambiguous. For instance, at governmental level, the post-1867 empire had an inbuilt 
potential breakline: the customs union between Austria and Hungary had to be 
renegotiated every ten years (and approved by both parliaments) and so had the so-
called ‘quota’, that is the proportion each part had to contribute to the joint budget 
covering common affairs (largely the army). Berend and Ránki (1967) argue that by the 
turn of the century the question of an independent Hungarian customs area had nearly 
become the dominant issue in Hungarian politics. However, they emphasize that this 
was so primarily for political and nationalist  reasons rather than on economic grounds. 
In the end, and despite the political deadlock in Austria’s parliamentary process since 
1897 that grew out of intensifying nationality conflict, the customs union continued to 
be renewed, if need be by decree. ‘The fact that the Hungarians did not take advantage 
of this situation [i.e. the political stalemate in the Austrian half of the empire] shows the 
importance of the Austrian market for Hungarian agricultural producers’ (Bruckmüller 
and Sandgruber 2003). 
While the core political and economic interests of the Germans and the Magyars 
as the dominant groups in the two halves of the empire (without either of them having 
an absolute population majority in Cis- and Transleithania) were recognized and 
broadly accommodated in the constitutional compromise of 1867 that established the 
Dual Monarchy, those of the Slavic people in both parts of the empire were not. There 
is evidence going beyond the mere observation of increasingly pervasive nationalism 
within the empire that suggests deepening social and economic separation between self-
integrating national communities in the decades following the Ausgleich (Bruckmüller 
and Sandgruber 2003). However, the extent of these phenomena, their overall 
quantitative significance within the broader context of Habsburg economic development 
and their role in the empire’s eventual dissolution remain problems unresolved (cf. 
Eddie 1989). 
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III. Grain Price Data, Languages and Locational Spread 
 
Did ethnic and national conflicts within the empire affect economic relations? Did they 
provide the fault-lines along which the Empire finally split in the wake of World War 
One? As suggested by Good (1984) and others, it is at least possible that political efforts 
to increase the coherence of the empire and its economy through the construction of 
railways and other measures successfully counteracted tendencies of disintegration. 
Here we use price data for four types of grain in ten major cities of the empire to 
examine this question. 4 The grains are wheat, rye, barley, and oats for which we could 
find a nearly complete set of annual prices 1877-1909. The main source for the price 
data are SJB and ÖSH, augmented by Pribram (1938, on Vienna), Hoszowoski (1934, 
on Lemberg), Gorkiewicz (1950, on Cracow) and Preisstatistik (1913, on Budapest). 
Correcting for the variation in weight measures used across cities and the change in 
monetary units varied over time, all prices have been standardized to Austrian Heller 
per 100 kilogramme. The data are thus comparable both in the cross-section and over 
time. 
The sample of cities and the most prominent regional population characteristics5 
include 
(a) Vienna, Linz, Graz, Innsbruck, all of which were in regions with large German 
majorities and that became part of the post-World War I state of Austria;  
(b) Budapest, the centre of Hungary in both its pre- and postwar borders, with a 
substantial Hungarian majority but significant (though declining) German 
minority;  
(c) Prague in Bohemia where about two thirds of the population were Czech and 
about one third German, later becoming the capital of Czechoslovakia ;  
(d) Cracow and Lemberg in Galicia where more than half the provincial population 
was Polish and which became part of the future Polish state;  
                                                 
4 We are currently incorporating annual observations from a further ten cities in the Hungarian (or 
‘Transleithaninan’) half of the Habsburg Empire to the data set.  
5 For 1880-1910, the Austrian censuses report only the main languages spoken by the regional 
populations, rather than their nationality or ethnicity. With the exception of Budapest, where nationality 
data are available, we use the main language spoken as a proxy for the provincial populations’ 
composition by nationality. A comparison of the 1880 language data with the 1857 census data on 
nationality indicates a very close match even if allowance is made for inter-temporal shifts in the 
composition. Cf. Horch (1992) on the relationship between language and (national) identity in the 
Habsbrug context. 
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(e) Czernowitz in the Bukowina where Ukrainians and Romanian accounted for the 
largest population shares and which was ceded to Romania after the First World 
War; finally 
(f)   Trieste in the Littoral that was dominated by Italians and Slovenes.  
 
Map 1 indicates the geographical location of these cities.  
 
[Map 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 reports in detail the composition of the population by language for all 
regions surrounding the cities in the sample. The most striking features here are the 
pronounced linguistic heterogeneity across the major regions within which these cities 
were located and, in some cases, the shifts in population shares held by the different 
nationalities.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
For instance, in 1880 only slightly more than half of the population of Budapest 
was Hungarian, by 1910 this had risen to over 80 per cent while the proportion of the 
German population had fallen from initially over 30 to less than 10 per cent. A similar if 
not quite so dramatic development can be observed for the relative increase of the 
Polish population in Galicia. In one case, the fact that these statistics refer to the whole 
provinces and not to their respective capital cities can be problematic. Innsbruck is 
situated in the German dominated northern part of Tyrol, while there is a very strong 
Italian and Ladinian element in the province south of the Alps. This strongly affects the 
overall provincial balance and distinguishes it from that prevalent in Innsbruck. We 
account for this issue in our estimation procedures (see Section IV below). 
  
IV. Empirical Strategy and Econometric Results 
 
We are going to test the hypothesis that an increasing degree of national self-
consciousness, and hence of national heterogeneity, affected commodity markets similar 
to political borders via network effects: two cities with little or no ethnic differences 
will tend to trade more with each other than cities with larger ethnic differences, 
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because trade networks tend to evolve along social and ethnic contacts (Greif 1993, 
Rauch and Trinidade 2002). This seems somewhat at odds with Good’s (1984) view 
that the empire became increasingly integrated. Figures 1 and 2 plot the coefficient of 
variation over the cross-section of our ten cities for each kind of grain, 1877-1909.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
What we see is that, indeed, for wheat, rye, barley, and oats the volatility of 
prices declined substantially. However, this summary statistic hides the fact that some 
city pairs integrated far more than others did. To explore this asymmetric integration 
more systematically, we examine the complete set of price differences between all 
possible city-pairs in our sample. Based on Engel, Rogers and Wang (2003) we use 
differences in price levels (in logs) as a dependent variable to capture long-term price 
deviations. These differences should increase in trade costs, where we distinguish 
between transportation costs and other cost components that increase in geographical 
distance on the one hand, and cost components related to existing or even just 
prospective ethnic or national borders on the other hand. We estimate the following 
specification: 
 










21, *** e , 
 
where vk tij,  is the log-difference of prices of grain k between cities i and j at time 
t, raildist is the log of km-distance on railways between the two cities, the variables time 
and location are a full set of interacted dummies to capture time-specific location 
factors, while e k tij, is an i.i.d. error component.  
In a first step of our analysis we ask whether we can find the fault- lines of 
political dismemberment already in the pre-war data. To this end we define border as a 
dummy variable which is defined along the post-war borders that separated the 
monarchy’s successor states after 1918: 
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       1 if cities i, j after WWI separated by a border 
      0 else.  
 
 
The model is estimated by OLS, where we start by pooling over all four types of 
grain and estimate a set of average coefficients over the complete period 1877-1909. 
Then we let the coefficients vary between two periods 1877-1895 and 1896-1909, while 
in a third variant we allow the coefficients to vary in three-year intervals. We also 
estimate the average and time-specific models pooled over all types of grain and for 
each kind of grain separately. Table 2 gives these results. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 In general we confirm the hypothesis that price differences can be modelled as a 
function of two kinds of trade costs. Both, the distance on railway-connections, which 
serves as a proxy for all kind of distance-related trade costs and the coefficient of our 
border-dummy are significant in the pooled model. However, the costs related to trading 
across regional boundaries that subsequently became national borders within the 
Habsburg Empire seem to increase over time. To put it the other way around: falling 
into a region that after the war formed part of the same national state, significantly 
lowered trade costs between any pair of cities from 1895 onwards, but not before. This 
effect is slightly smaller for wheat than for rye (or barley or oats), which is entirely in 
line with economic reasoning. The higher the unit value of a good, the higher is usually 
the trade-margin of that good and hence, the smaller the expected trade-diverting effect 
of any new trade barrier.  
What is driving this emerging border effect? One possibility is, for instance, that 
increasing inter-regional differences in the density of communications networks 
followed already before the war the fault- lines of future political dismemberment. If this 
were the case systematically, it would not be captured in the time-varying distance 
measure but show up in the estimated coefficient on the border dummy. Another, and in 
the Habsburg historiographical context particularly interesting, hypothesis is that 
nationality conflicts impacted on agents’ economic behaviour. 
(1)   borderij = 
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Is the estimated border effect which seems to rise from about 1895 onwards, 
really an effect of growing tensions between different ethnic groups of the Habsburg 
Empire? If so, we should be able to explain the border-effect by some measure of ethnic 
heterogeneity. To this end, we use the language statistics from Table 1 to construct an 
index of heterogeneity according to the following formula: 
 



















where a kti, is the percentage share of language k at province i and time t, and n is 
the total number of language groups (in our case nine). The index varies between 0 (no 
differences) and 1 (no similarities) and is therefore comparable to our 0/1 border 
dummy. If the emerging border was driven by tensions between ethnic groups and if 
ethnic groups mainly define themselves via language, our index might help to explain 
the estimated border effect. To test this, we re-estimate (1) replacing the border dummy 
by our index of language heterogeneity (2). In a next step, we re-estimate the border-
effect controlling for language heterogeneity. Table 3 reports the results. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 As hypothesized, language differences essentially capture the estimated border 
effect. They have a very similar impact on relative price integration and if we re-
estimate the border effect controlling for language heterogeneity, this border effect 
vanishes.6  
                                                 
6 Note that we add a special control for Innsbruck for two reasons: first, while after WWI the city of 
Innsbruck belonged to the Austrian Republic, most of the province of Tyrol did not. Second, Innsbruck is 
situated in the predominantly German-speaking northern part of Tyrol, while overall there was a very 
large Italian population in Tyrol south of the Alps which also shows up in the language statistics and 
hence, in our index of language differences.  
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V. Conclusion: Some Implications and Speculations  
 
The key finding of our preliminary analysis, namely that language matters in explaining 
price dynamics in the late 19th century Habsburg Empire, raises several important 
issues. 
First, if this evidence of emerging ‘national preference’ in grain markets can be 
read as being indicative of broader patterns across the economy (and there is no a priori 
reason to assume that grain traders behaved more or less nationalistically than other 
economic agents), then its seems likely that product markets overall displayed degrees 
of integration that were conditioned by, essentially, non-economic considerations. With 
the coefficient on distance fluctuating but not falling, it is not clear how, in a world of 
increasing absolute price integration as documented in declining coefficients of 
variation across the Habsburg regions, the relative costs of trading with others not 
sharing the same linguistic characteristics per se should have increased over the period 
1877-1909 and thus account for the observed shifts. In other words, it does not seem 
that the rising importance of language heterogeneity merely reflects relatively declining 
transport costs (i.e. shifts in the composition of transaction costs). Pushed further and 
located within the context of the empire’s domestic market, a generalized national 
preference argument suggests a reduction in the size of the market served. Simply put, 
the number of Czech, German or Hungarian consumers (or producers) is bound to be 
smaller than their combined total. Collective behaviour characterized by national 
preference is thus likely to have reduced the scope for the realization of economies of 
scale and specialization (cf. Koren 1961). In a world with constant or increasing returns 
this may well have constrained, ceteris paribus, the level and growth of output. 
Second, the coefficient on inter-regional language differences is positive and 
significant from the mid-/late 1890s onwards, but not before. This is broadly consistent 
with the findings of the political historiography that stresses the rise in intra-empire 
ethnic conflict from the late 1880s and, in particular, the political deadlock between the 
Czechs and Germans from the 1890s (Sked, 2001; Kornish, 1949). In light of these 
profound political conflicts it does not seem too far-fetched to hypothesize that agents’ 
economic behaviour began to follow essentially political criteria. 
Third, one might argue in the spirit of Alesina and Spolaore (2003) that the 
observed process of disintegration is evidence in favour of a triangular interaction 
between economies of scale, costs of heterogeneity and economic integration. In their 
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simple model the optimal size of states is determined by a trade-off between economies 
of scale in the provision of public goods such as means of payment or the enforcement 
of commercial laws on the one hand, and the costs of heterogeneous preferences about 
the quality of these public goods on the other. In this framework an exogenous increase 
in heterogeneity, due to, say, some diffuse “awakening of national self-consciousness” 
may have directly created separatist movements in parts of the Empire. However, on top 
of that and more interestingly, their model predicts that a perceived increase in world-
wide integration during the period up to the First World War may have changed the 
expected costs and benefits of having a separate nation state for the actors of such 
separatist movements. The probability of survival for small countries depends crucially 
on their access to markets outside their national borders. Put differently, while in the 
short run separatism created new barriers to trade, the very fact that people observed a 
decline in world transport costs might have fuelled the hopes of smaller ethnic groups to 
have their own national state.  
Fourth, the new evidence suggests that grain markets in the pre-First World War 
period integrated increasingly along linguistic lines. For sure, regional boundaries did 
not coincide with linguistic boundaries as shown in Table 1 (herein lies, after all, the 
rationale of using language variables), but the pre-war regional borders within which 
certain languages dominated matched very well with what became post-war national 
borders. The key issue then is that for the years prior to the First World War we observe 
a re-alignment in relative market integration that seems to anticipate the post-war 
political settlement and the formation of the Habsburg successor states. One implication 
of this result is that the economic costs of breaking up the Habsburg customs union after 
the First World War may have been smaller than thought so far since market integration 
evolved already before the war into a pattern broadly compatible with the post-war 
political re-alignment. This finding complements recent research on Poland’s 
unification after the First World War (see Wolf 2005; Trenkler and Wold 2005) 
showing that the former borders that divided the new Polish state persistently affected 
economic life for another fifteen years or so after their removal. The shock of the new 
borders that rearranged the map of Central Europe since 1914-18 had its harbingers 
already twenty years before it materialized. 
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   Table 1: The Heterogeneity of Population – Provincial Population by Language 
 
 
   
 Main Language Spoken 
Province 
Provincial 
Capital Year German 
Czech/ 
Slovakian Polish Ukrainian Slovenian 
Serbo-
Croatian Italian Romanian Hungarian 
1880 0,969 0,028 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 Lower 
Austria Vienna 1910 0,959 0,037 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
1880 0,995 0,005 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 Upper 
Austria Linz 1910 0,997 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
1880 0,670 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,327 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Styria Graz 1910 0,705 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,293 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
1880 0,021 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,326 0,200 0,453 0,000 0,000 
Littoral Trieste 1910 0,035 0,003 0,001 0,000 0,322 0,206 0,431 0,001 0,000 
1880 0,594 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,404 0,000 0,000 
Tyrol Innsbruck 1910 0,621 0,004 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,373 0,000 0,000 
1880 0,372 0,628 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Bohemia Prague 1910 0,368 0,632 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
1880 0,055 0,001 0,515 0,429 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Galicia 
Lemberg/ 
Cracow 1910 0,011 0,001 0,585 0,402 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
1880 0,191 0,003 0,032 0,422 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,334 0,017 
Bukovina Czernowitz 1910 0,212 0,001 0,046 0,384 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,344 0,013 
1880 0,343 0,061 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,567 
Budapest* Budapest 1910 0,090 0,023 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,861 
* Shares reported refer to city of Budapest (i.e. not district or region) and represent nationality rather than main language. 
Sources: Bolognese-Leuchtmüller (1978), pp. 28ff. ; MSE (1911).  
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Table 2: Impact of Post-war Borders on Pre-war Price Behaviour 



















1877-79 -0.06 (0.036) 
1880-82 -0.09 (0.037) 
1883-85 -0.139 (0.036) 
1886-88 -0.05 (0.036) 















1895-97 0.158 (0.040) 
1898-00 0.301 (0.040) 
1901-03 0.273 (0.041) 




















1877-79 0.089 (0.011) 
1880-82 0.033 (0.012) 
1883-85 0.105 (0.012) 
1886-88 0.070 (0.012) 













1895-97 0.091 (0.012) 
1898-00 0.107 (0.012) 
1901-03 0.116 (0.012) 

































Adj. R2  0.24 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.37 








Table 3: Explaining the Borders by Language Heterogeneity 
  Pooled, language 
heterogeneity 
Pooled, borders and 
language heterogeneity 
  Coeff. (Stddev.) 
 (Stdev) 
Coeff. (Stddev.) 
 (Stdev) C0*Langdiff 1877-79 -1.730 (0.355) -0,822 (0.629) 
 1880-82 -2.678 (0.356) -3.097 (0.639) 
 1883-85 -3.287 (0.348) -4.703 (0.638) 
 1886-88 -1.923 (0.346) -2.297 (0.651) 
 1889-91 -3.617 (0.344) -3.681 (0.669) 
 1892-94 -1.185 (0.349) 0.121 (0.683) 
 1895-97 0.843 (0.347) 0.886 (0.674) 
 1898-00 2.333 (0.349) 2.606 (0.683) 
 1901-03 1.979 (0.346) 2.424 (0.695) 
 1904-06   1.883 (0.340) 2.305 (0.695) 
 1907-09 1.597 (0.326) 1.437 (0.683) 
1877-79 - -0.191 (0.075) 
1880-82 - 0.016 (0.076) 
1883-85 - 0.166 (0.077) 
1886-88 - -0.009 (0.079) 
1889-91 - -0.025 (0.083) 
1892-94 - -0.225 (0.088) 
1895-97 - -0.068 (0.089) 
1898-00 - -0.094 (0.092) 
1901-03 - -0.126 (0.094) 
1904-06 - -0.121 (0.095) 
C1*Border 
1907-09 - 0.001 (0.092) 
1877-79 0.153 (0.014) 0.127 (0.015) 
1880-82 0.112 (0.014) 0.087 (0.015) 
1883-85 0.192 (0.015) 0.168 (0.015) 
1886-88 0.141 (0.015) 0.117 (0.015) 
1889-91 0.157 (0.015) 0.129 (0.015) 
1892-94 0.120 (0.015) 0.088 (0.015) 
1895-97 0.130 (0.015) 0.105 (0.015) 
1898-00 0.133 (0.015) 0.106 (0.015) 
1901-03 0.146 (0.015) 0.119 (0.015) 
1904-06 0.145 (0.015) 0.118 (0.015) 
C2*Raildist 
1907-09 0.145 (0.015) 0.116 (0.015) 
Innsbruck-controls  no yes 
Time* location Dummies yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.32 0.39 
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